

## Socialist Study Seminar.

### Memo 3.

1. One of the points touched on in the previous memo but not developed or integrated into the programme is the question of the revolution itself. This includes: a) how the revolution is made; b) the immediate actions on taking over state power. On the first of these, we have the striking contrasts of three African socialist countries: Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique. The post-revolutionary experience in Mozambique is quite distinct from Malcolm's description - although there are features which do not accord with some socialist traditions (an emphasis on hierarchy for example) - there are many others which makes Mozambique a quite distinct creative socialist experience. Examples: socialist democracy and the form of elections; the army still structured as the guerilla army and not a professional standing army of regular soldiers; the character of the party. These points all concern the structure of power, how it is reproduced and to what end, and how it relates to classes as they exist in Mozambique. Though in form there are many similarities between say Mozambique and Ethiopia - the latter sees the formation of a party as an urgent task, it has developed the decentralised political and economic institutions of the kebelles, it has carried out a massive land reform in the South, and a major programme of nationalisation of both private industry and urban land. Yet there could be no greater contrast to the relations between the ruling group (the army) and the working class. In Ethiopia there is an alliance between the army, echelons of the bureaucracy (now purged), and the lumpen proletariat, against a distinct strata of the working class and the socialist intelligentsia (students, some bureaucrats). How do we explain the contrast with Mozambique, or that between Angola and Mozambique, or indeed between Algeria and Mozambique?

2. The first contrast is Mozambique's party. It was FRELIMO which organised the power of liberation. It was an organisation filtered according to a commitment towards a particular type of revolution. In Angola on the other hand, the three contending groups were forged in other fires, eclectic amalgams of groups with varied class interests and in many cases an incoherent perception of post-revolutionary strategy. They lacked the clear political line of FRELIMO, and in part this may explain the divisions between them. Of course there were other forces: imperialist interests willing to pump oxygen into any withered sack that could promise preferment, a different economic and therefore socio-political inheritance. But whatever the cause or rather the material basis for the divisions in Angola, and for the characteristics of the liberating groups, the fact of these divisions and these lines clearly underlies the distinct developments in Angola which have taken place after the MPLA took state power.

3. In Ethiopia, power was seized not by any party but by a military organisation fashioned after American practice, and this organisation proceeded to organise a sustained campaign for smashing the one revolutionary political organisation which did exist, the EPRP. To do so they had to organise new alliances, similar to those organised by the MPLA in Angola, though with different relative balances, and new institutions of control.

4. It is clearly not merely the existence of a single socialist party which is determining. The party will be subject to the struggle of different lines. It may lack the power to gain control. After all the EPRP was without doubt a revolutionary party in the sense of FRELIMO, as, too, in different ways are elements of the Eritrean Liberation Struggle. The historical context of the struggle - against colonialism in Mozambique, against ~~feudal absolutism~~ feudal absolutism and neo-colonialism in Ethiopia - will constitute another factor. It will determine who are the principal enemy forces, and ~~the relative strengths of the various revolutionary~~ forces (layers of the peasantry, sections of the working class, bureaucracy, petit bourgeoisie, intelligensia, local capitalist). Thirdly, there is the experience of the struggle itself. The MPLA controlled liberated zones in Angola, but they were thinly populated and marginal to the main body of Angolan rural society. In Ethiopia the army followed the path of creeping revolution, or revolutionary gradualism from above. They held the ring in the centre, while the revolution was made in the countryside by ~~peasant forces~~ peasant forces, organised locally rather than nationally through the medium of the zemetcha students. FRELIMO on the other hand experienced effective state power in the liberated zone - an embattled state power certainly, but one that had the strength to transform relations of production in agriculture. The importance of this way of making the revolution is summarised in their remark of Machel(?) that the Portuguese defeat came too soon.

5. The last line of Shelley's <sup>a</sup>Mask of Anarchy is a call to the labourers of England to rise against its ancien regime: X "Ye are many, they are few". For all ruling classes this is the problem - they are few, and the ruled are many. But it is also the problem for the socialist party. The party, certainly initially, will always be few (some fewer than others). Their strength comes through the very process of filtering, of reducing, of boiling down, ~~strengthening~~. Their battle is against other organisations of the few, some of ~~them~~ them in alliance, some in ~~the~~ control of material organisations, the state apparatus, the army, companies. These organisations have a consolidated power, relying not merely on members of the 'few', but a much wider population who sell their labour to these ~~organisations~~ <sup>people</sup> with greater or lesser commitment to their aims, and practises.

6. For a revolutionary party the task is: a) to expand the number of those committed to the party's goal; b) to weaken the commitment of the workers ~~involved~~ involved in the 'production' of power by the ruling class - industrial workers, workers in communications industries, those holding the barrell of a gun; c) strengthen its own organisations, composed of both party members and those sympathetic to the aims of the revolution. There is no better way of doing all three than the practise of the concrete. "Truth is in the concrete. The dreamers' law of value. Capitalist society is always struggling against the revolutionary effects induced by its concrete productions: it offers different ways of seeing; it encourages other channells for dreaming, it discounts the

claims of social dreams. And of course it can always offer to some the concreteness of its commodities. The party counters this. It ~~gives~~ offers different ways of seeing. It gives confidence to social dreamers, and by discussing dreams collectively, changes them. It ~~works~~ fights against the parochialism of the concrete, the tyranny of the immediate, and asks the ruled to raise their claims. And what more forceful and immediate way than working from the base, changing social relations as one builds, within the party, within the socialist pre-figurative forms, within the autonomous zones from which the direct tyranny of capital has been expelled. Here is revolutionary gradualism from the base. The creation of an identity and a social unity in practise.

7. If we draw a distinction then between the professed aims and positions of a party, and the character of the social relations which they have built within their zones of autonomy (beginning with the party itself, its processes of intellectual, political, and organisational production - think <sup>by way of contrast</sup> only of the relations of political manufacture within the mass Social Democratic parties of Western Europe) then the experience of the party (or the ~~new~~ new holders of power) before they take state power is central. The more conscious that experience, the greater its 'pre-revolutionary' concrete achievements, the larger its autonomous zones, the longer its growth, then the firmer will be its roots when state power is seized.

8. For the seizure of state power marks a discontinuity. It firstly signals a drastic retreat of capital from a geographical zone, i.e. a loss of power by the enemy. Secondly, it marks an increase in power for the party/group. This power comes from ~~two~~ things: a) the change in relative position vis à vis the main enemy as mentioned above; b) claims on resources far wider than before, through the control of the systems of state levies; c) the discontinuous strengthening of control over the armed force of society. Capital will attempt to regroup: sometimes it retreats to a region, (the Ethiopian reactionaries - the UDA - tried to establish bases, zones of autonomy, of their own in the politically more conservative parts of North West Ethiopia,) or supports insurgents (UNITA?) or coup makers (Cuba). Sometimes it will support neighbouring states in battle with the new socialist country. Sometimes it opts for a compromise: the yielding of state power, for a consolidation of economic power (JM/Angola). Or it may exercise its power which can be controlled from outside the territory: trade ~~embargoes~~ embargoes, foreign seizures. All these responses by capital are ~~more~~ even more graphically exhibited in Asia: retreats from the North to the South in Korea and Vietnam, (like the British in Ireland ~~in~~ following a contrary compass), the build up of a rival state in Taiwan to maintain a presence, to exhibit capital, to relay the chattering of cheap commodities to the many in China. But in spite of all these strategems, the capture of the power of the state nevertheless greatly increases the range of the zones of autonomy.

9. At the same time there are two consequences: first the increase in power simultaneously increases the absolute power of the groups who are currently in control of the party/group. They may use state power, the power of levy of money and people, the force of arms to re-filter the party according to their project, to mould it nearer to their heart's desire.

Second, the discontinuous increase in the zones of autonomy, creates its own contradictions. The revolution in relations of production has to be produced. It requires labour, a labour that is directed, sensitive to the concrete, creative, formidable. And the party may not have developed sufficient reservoirs of such ~~simple~~ labour to irrigate the revolution. What then? On the one hand extrapolations of relative power <sup>balance.</sup> consequent on the seizure of state power - think only of <sup>the effects of</sup> Zimbabwe at ~~the~~ moment. <sup>quite just on</sup> On the other, unfiltered labour <sup>fills a major</sup> gathered into the revolutionary leviathan and providing a basis for changes in the party's general direction.

10. What other contradictions? ~~Next~~ One clear one is a contradiction of tasks. The fighting of a war, a liberation struggle before the revolution, a defense of the revolution afterwards, demands armed forces organised for battle. When this is all consuming and the predominant task of the party, how to ensure that the relations of production in military labour, do not hegemonise the relations of production in all other labour processes, political, economic, ideological. Capital in departing, leaves its mark dialectical behind. It stamps its seal on the setting wax of the revolution. Algeria? If so, then the organisation of the liberation forces becomes one of the crucial roots of the revolution. How can we contrast them: not just Ethiopia and her standing army with capitalist relations of force, as against Frelimo. But how does Frelimo compare with ~~XXXXXX~~ the MPLA, Unita, the Zimbabwean liberation forces, Vietnam, China, the IRA?

11. To the debate on the party, we add the debate on the army, since it may determine the outcome of the ~~party's~~ debate on the party. And we can expand this: how do different <sup>organisations</sup> of the party (the central political labour process) fit the many post revolutionary tasks? Do we dare ~~to~~ classify these tasks in terms of manufacture, machinofacture, and systemofacture, of processing as against assembly, of flow line ~~production~~ as against batch production. What labour processes - outside those narrowly economic - is the revolutionary party called upon to perform?

12. There is one view that sees the tasks determining the structure of the party and the structure of state power. Thus for example it is argued that the agrarian problem in Russia, the need to revolutionise productivity and extract surplus product for the towns, necessarily implied a Stalin. On the other hand there is a view which sees the party as relatively autonomous, as master of its own destiny, the subject of collective will. Much of the Trotskyist work on Stalinism and on Maoism strikes me as running in this vein. The collective discussion we had on Maitan's book on the Cultural Revolution raised a number of instances where that author (and Fred H. in his review) held up a somewhat Utopian view of proletarian democracy to contrast with the practises of the Cultural Revolution. Now the point is not to suspend all judgement and imagination of alternative ways, but rather to approach this issue of power and the party with a materialist analysis before we launch into the optimism of the will.

13. The experience of the party (and the society) before the revolution must constitute one part of such analysis. Amongst other things, it will certainly throw light on the debates among ourselves about the nature of the political movement that we should be trying to build in the advanced capitalist countries. A confined, intellectual vanguard party whose point of reference is predominantly the revolutionary moment to the relative exclusion of what comes before and after, already looks somewhat different in this light. So does social democracy. ~~The issue becomes not whether~~ <sup>the issue becomes not whether</sup> one of reform or revolution, but what kind of revolution, and how to prepare for it. What would constitute a policy of developing autonomous zones in advanced capitalist countries, and indeed in different third world countries. (Consider here the experience of the communalis in Mexico which were truly this, zones of proletarian autonomy, shanty towns, with their own laws, courts, police, factories, schools, health provisions all created against the grain of capital (no more evident than in their explicit challenge to ~~the~~ sexism), constantly subject to erosion by the Mexican state, but contesting, and countering with claims for further assarting. Or in Europe, the strategy of parts of the left in Portugal of creating zones of proletarian autonomy - in the countryside, in peasants co-operatives, with likewise ~~their own~~ claims to ~~the~~ administer their own popular justice, their own productive labour processes, and so on.)

14. This then is one point to make in response to 'voluntaristic theses on the ~~experience~~ <sup>experience</sup> of revolutionary parties after the revolution. It is not to deny that parties can, we hope, make their own history, but rather that the history they make will be determined in part before and not just at and after the revolution. The structure of the party before the revolution, its strategies, its internal ~~social relations~~ social relations, will set in train great tides whose force will become real, part of the material ~~base~~ base that supports (or constrains' ~~the~~ the development of the project after the revolution.

15. Secondly, we should <sup>note</sup> once more <sup>the</sup> tension between task and organisation which is absent in ~~the~~ both poles of the voluntarism/determinism debate. ~~The former~~ <sup>The former</sup> separates the question of organisation from the post-revolutionary task (though not of course from the ~~task~~ task of making the revolution in the first place.) The latter introduces a third strand of socialist thinking and practise which tries to derive the task ~~from~~ from the nature of the organisation. All reduce an irreducible. The relation of task and organisation is contradictory, and if not recognised as such, both will suffer.

16. As far as making the revolutionary moment and seizing the power of the state is concerned, the arguments ~~around~~ around democratic centralism ~~have~~ have been focussed on this contradiction. How does one have a unified striking arm, at the same time as a party democracy? Democratic centralism is one answer. But whatever our views on it as an answer to

that question, there is still the issue of whether it is the best organisational response to the long periods preceding and succeeding the revolution. This is far more problematic and is recognised as such within the democratic centralist groups in advanced capitalist countries. (see the interesting exchange between Richard Kuper and Chris Harman in a recent issue of Socialist Review. Harman's response to Kuper's opening out of the problem in contemporary Britain, was to re-iterate the correctness of ~~the~~ democratic centralism for the moment of revolution. He did not consider the possibility that the tasks before the revolution and afterwards might be such ~~as to~~ that a democratically centralised vanguard organisation would be/inappropriate form. )

17. The cultural revolution was a monumental attempt to re-assert the party as the subject of history after the revolution against the forces thrown up by the tasks - notably in the army and bureaucracy. It recognised the contradiction, and articulated it (did it not) from the individual ( the ~~two~~ two roads contend within all of us) to class, to the whole of China and beyond. It attempted to shake history by the scruff of the neck. What I would like to understand is Mao's materialist analysis of what made capitalist roadism, what was its source. Since empirically part of that source seemed to be the nature of ~~the~~ some of the organisations at the heart of Chinese power - the armed forces, and administration both of party and of state - a materialist understanding might suggest ways in which the contradiction between task and organisation could be surpassed in a manner which weakened the tendencies of capitalist roadism.

18. The above has been concerned with the theme - suggested by Malcolm and Oliver's contrast of Angola and Mozambique - that the revolutionary tree, its character and spaces of potential development, must at least in part be understood in relation to the seed and its growth before it breaks through the earth <sup>at the moment of</sup> the seizing of state power. The point - so palpable in the case of these two countries - is not meant to ~~make~~ the real openness ~~of the~~ immediately post revolutionary period. In spite of the origins of the Ethiopian revolution, the creative acts and struggles of the last four years in that country defy reduction. Rather the discussion has sought to register the issue - the issue of the history of the revolution, and ~~of~~ of the revolutionary party, as being one part of the material basis of the post revolutionary period itself. If we insist that the direction of "socialist development strategy" is a matter of politics rather than policy, then this discussion merely suggests that that politics starts before the revolution and not just afterwards. In saying this - and if the general point does hold to any degree - then it also relates to the matter most affecting us, viz. the organisation and direction of our own political practise in advanced capitalist countries. SY once remarked that the task of socialist revolutionaries began in earnest after the revolution. It was a remark aimed against the revolutionary moment itself as terminus ad quem; or should we say the seizure of state power, since that puts it in perspective. His practise - indeed all of ours - has been groping towards a similar perspective on that moment (we have perhaps lost sight of it at times), and has been an attempt to build zones of autonomy. The link

[This is a note of the author]

between the before and after makes more specific what has upto now been a general prex-supposition, about the relation of form and task in the long revolution.

19. The second general issue~~xxxx~~ not covered in earlier outlines of the programme is the immediate period after the seizure of state power. Here we may distinguish two things: first the continuation of the war against capital which almost universally characterises the revolutionary period, and second, the question of immediate internal restructuring. On the first, the war as military contest ~~will not necessarily~~ continue. In Russia, there was the period of war communism. In Angola the struggle against rival liberation groups backed by sections of international capital continues. In Ethiopia, the fighting is against a whole range of armed movements - the EPRP (an urban guerrilla struggle very largely), the EDU as the focus for reactionary fighting, Somalia (how fortuitously and ~~xxxx~~Eritrea. The Vietnamese had to fight on twenty years after the defeat of the French, and the regional specification of the capitalist opposition in the South. Mozambique and Cuba on the other hand, though they had<sup>to</sup> ~~organise~~ <sup>have</sup> for external invasion from capital, ~~xxxx~~ were/are not involved in an all dominating military campaign to preserve their control on state power. It remains ~~xxxx~~ <sup>common</sup> nevertheless that new socialist regimes, born from armed struggle, have to continue it in the immediate post revolutionary period, and this poses questions of supply of fighters, their subsistence, and military equipment and materials. How far has the seizure of state power changed the way in which the armed forces are organised? How far ~~is~~ <sup>has</sup> the common change in the nature of the struggle, against an external enemy ~~xx~~ and/or a particular region, lead to changes in military requirements, and the character of the military labour process? How far does the the seizure of state power mean that other countries, particular socialist countries as they actually exist, are more willing to fund the struggle, at the same time as exporting their own characteristic military labour processes along with the hardware and the advisers? How did the Bolsheviks organise their army against the white Russian forces? How different were relations within that army to those that had characterised the Tsarist armies of the first world war. Note the resistance of the Ethiopian army to succumb to Soviet/Cuban advisers and re-organisation~~xxx~~ in the military field.

20. Quite apart from military campaigns, capital will respond economically: the rapid run down of liquid assets; external interruptions in the international circuits of capital that touch the revolutionary economic space; including trade embargoe the cut down on credit and aid, the seizure of monetary reserves, or of overseas asset~~s~~ holdings by the revolutionary regime. A very clear example of economic warfare of this type was conducted by France against Guinea from 1958 onwards. The most immediate actions by France were the ~~xxxx~~ withdrawal of key technicians who had been operating under French technical assistance, the cutting of aid, the restriction on trade. At some point the Guinean reserves in French banks were embargoed, Guinea left the Franc Zone, and only the French aluminium concern Pechiney Ugine, continued business as usual with the consent of their home government, because of the French dependence on its products. The point about the French action

is that it was initiated not by any Guinean government appropriations, but in response to the Guinean vote for independence. If Guinea wished for <sup>political</sup> independence said de Gaulle then she would have political independence and economic dependence as well.

21. In such a <sup>circumstance</sup> (the Cuban embargo was another example) one of the major concerns of the revolutionary government will be to neutralise these counterthrusts, to stop the financial haemorrhage, and to maintain production of both necessities and military materials (or the exchange to buy the military materials) so that both the society and the regime can continue.

The immediate controls over the movement of capital and labour are geared to this end, but this will do nothing to remedy the effects of the disruption of inflows of finance and necessary use values - spare parts notably - which characterises such situations (Allende's Chile was hit by both of these).

22. The line between both the military and economic attacks of capital and the revolutionary response on the one hand, and the immediate tasks of internal restructuring on the other may at times be difficult to draw. In some cases the intensity of the capitalist hostility will be related to internal restructuring. A case of this is the expropriation of foreign capital. International capital will in general be much more sensitive to this than the expropriation of an indigenous capitalist class (whether this class be in fact native to the country or composed of immigrants). China I understand left the expropriation of foreign capital for a year or two, and then effectively froze them out through the use of state purchasing power. Chile went straight into copper expropriation, and in some ways could be said to have trod on a scorpion (particularly since there appears to have been no significant change in the relations of production at the copper mines, and indeed the government found itself finally opposed to the copper workers). Ethiopia has taken a mid way course. Nationalising foreign capital, and delaying discussion of compensation so it is not clear to the capitalists or their home government whether they face an act of nationalisation or expropriation. The nationalisation allowed the Ethiopian government the opportunity of controlling the companies - a control they took up in the case of the firms owned by foreign 'indigenous' capitalists, and some of the smaller foreign firms. The change of control had an immediate consequence politically in terms of opposition forces being weakened, and left the way open for a restructuring of both the technical and social side the production process (establishment of co-operation rather than competition between formerly rival plants, free exchange of information, planned co-ordination of production and expansion, plus in four or five plants a period of workers control.) The strategy and experience of nationalising large scale capitalist industry should be the subject of a separate paper which can be discussed in a working group at the seminar.



23. What other things have been immediately implemented in revolutions. In Ethiopia there were the following:

- land to the tiller; the abolishing of landlordism, and redistribution to those who worked the land.
- the establishment of organs of peasant power, economic and political, (Peasant Associations). These carried through the land reform, and many were eventually armed (one of the key issues in the early period). But they also organised producer co-operatives on the land itself.
- nationalisation of urban land, and confiscation of second houses.
- the establishment of kebelles in the cities, each with an average of say 500 houses, funded through renting out the second houses within their area, financing self-build housing for the homeless, encouraging co-operative production of crafts by women, acting as a medium of distribution of food, particularly for those items in short supply plus the locally produced crafts, plus ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ with their self-financed armed guards, they played a central role in the revolutionary government's attempt to reduce the EPRP.
- the nationalisation of the top 150 manufacturing firms, the banks and insurance companies, and the major plantations.
- the nationalisation of the commercial farms which were transformed into state capitalist farms.
- a massive programme of school building in the countryside.
- a reform of the currency.

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In this case, other than the expropriation of local capital which was in any case very jejeune, the main class <sup>in the towns</sup> attack has been on militant members of the labour movement, and the political intelligensia. There has not been a direct drive against the petit bourgeoisie, or large foreign capital (most of the large companies still operate the firms under ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ more or less formal management contracts). There has been an attempt to mobilise the lumpen proletariat and elements of the bureaucracy. In the countryside there ~~is~~ a decisive class drive has been to eradicate feudalism, and this has had its echoes in the towns. (I'm not clear what has happened to the extensive church lands. I remember being told of an issue within the Economic Committee as to bishop's pay. The more militant dirgue members and the administration urging a cut, and the right wing seeking to maintain it under a disguised heading. Judging by the aggressive and unstinting drive against feudalism, I would expect the church to have been reduced). The overall strategy has been to carry through a national democratic revolution, before the socialist revolution, and was inspired very much by the experience of China.

24. What we need for the seminar is a chronicling of these immediately post-revolutionary experience, bringing out the strategic thrust of this ~~immediate~~ action, the extent to which transformation of social relations both internally and in relation to imperialism can immediately release energy, ~~and~~ increase productivity, and maintain surplus product for local accumulation ( I am thinking of the immediate stopping of imperialist tribute in the form of debt repayments, the outflow of dividends and ~~and~~ fees, the correcting of ~~and~~ (some) manipulated transfer prices, the circulation of information

among formerly private competing firms, the use of surplus capacity in manufacturing to provide subsistence goods (cf. Chile), the cancellation of ~~rents~~ ground rent and its social appropriation for productive purposes, the disbanding of certain strata of unproductive labour and their transfer together with the unemployed to ~~the necessary~~ necessary social projects). Many of these things are effectively done with the stroke of a pen. They reflect the change in state power, and the discontinuous reduction in the power of private capitalist property. We can contrast these post revolutionary situations with the acts taken in pre-revolutionary situations when socialists control parts of the state apparatus but not others, and not, crucially, the armed forces, ~~this is the case of~~ (Chile for example).

25. It may be that we should tackle this question (and the previous one on ~~pre-revolutionary~~ pre-revolutionary experience) primarily in working groups, with an introductory session setting out the main lines of enquiry, and a concluding session which gathers everything together.

Socialist Study Seminar.

Memo 3 (addendum).

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1. In posing the revolution as a capture of state power, we raise simultaneously the question of continuity and discontinuity. State power is only one focus of social power. As Trotsky said, we must not believe that by capturing state power one is capturing power over the total society. Hence his point that Russia might be the first country to have a socialist revolution and the last to achieve socialism. So what further power does the capture of the central state apparatus give to a revolutionary movement? In the case of the Bolsheviks this may seem a somewhat absurd question: they were a small party, with relatively little armed power of their own, and no foci. But for China, or North Vietnam, or Frelimo, it is not so strange a question. For they controlled much of the decentralised state power in the liberated zones. Perhaps the decisive aspect of the capture of the capital is to reduce the power of capital in the area as much as to increase the power of the revolutionary movement. Formerly capital had an army operating in the territory, ~~based in the capital~~. After the seizure of the capital that army a) has lost its will to resist; b) lost its rights of levying conscripts from within the country, or raising taxes to pay for war; c) lost its physical base within the territory - and after all a physical base which was the centre of economic, political ~~quite~~ apart from military life.

2. ~~So,~~ In such circumstances, the revolutionary forces had considerable power, both militarily, and by territory in the liberated zones. (re-read the debate on foci and the geographical specification of pre-revolutionary power). What they gained through the seizure of national power was a relative as much as an absolute advantage, a throwing back of capital outside a territory, a demoralisation of capital, and the elimination of major organised opposition from within the country. (The significance of nationalism, or spatial consciousness is forcing its way through into the argument, both in terms of the consciousness of the many in a country, ~~and~~ and also in the consciousness of capital itself. While it will certainly launch external invasions, the very notion of national sovereignty in liberal thought, does introduce a ~~discontinuity~~ between an external invasion, and the financing of an internally-based, geographically specified, anti-revolutionary movement.)

3. While noting that capital has retreated, the posing of revolution as the capture of national state power, also reminds us of the backdrop of world capitalism to all revolutionary experience. Capital, after its defeat, will regroup, turning perhaps to other arrows in its quiver, militarily, economically, and ideologically. The zone of revolutionary autonomy has decisively increased, but it must still be defined as relative autonomy in relation to capital.

4. The question then posed is how this ~~enlarged~~ enlarged area of autonomy is administered in order to strengthen this autonomy rather than weaken it. It will have reduced the ~~military~~ martial powers of counter-revolutionary forces, but by no means their economic nor (in the case of the church) its ideological powers. How to counter and erode these powers? This is the intensive strategic question for a revolutionary regime, to set beside the extensive question of relations with world capital, and the actually existing socialist world.